En el presente trabajo se aborda la discusión acerca de la influencia de Nietzsche en el pensamiento transhumanista. El artículo sostendrá la tesis que no hay semejanzas estructurales entre ambas líneas de pensamiento. El principal argumento que respalda esta idea radica en que Nietzsche, a diferencia del transhumanismo, que plantea una mejora de la condición humana por medios tecnológicos con fines hedonistas, propone una superación del hombre de carácter moral por medio del superhombre y del pensamiento del eterno retorno.

El artículo analiza el concepto de mal radical de Kant y sostiene que su explicación del mal utiliza un modelo reconstructivo que niega la atribución de los modelos de adicción o del mal hábito. Se critica la tesis de la “revolución en la disposición moral fundamental”, primero, porque Kant abandona el método fenomenológico-trascen- dental y, segundo, por el carácter semipelagiano de su argumentación.

RESUMEN El artículo analiza el concepto de mal radical de Kant y sostiene que su explicación del mal utiliza un modelo reconstructivo que niega la atribución de los modelos de adicción o del mal hábito. Se critica la tesis de la "revolución en la disposición moral fundamental", primero, porque Kant abandona el método fenomenológico-trascendental y, segundo, por el carácter semipelagiano de su argumentación. ABSTRACT The article analyzes Kant's concept of radical evil and argues that his explanation of evil uses a (...) reconstructive model that denies the attribution of the models of addiction or bad habits. It criticizes the thesis of "revolution in fundamental moral disposition" for two reasons; first, Kant abandons the phenomenological-transcendental method, and, second, due to his arguments' semi-Pelagian nature. (shrink)

El libro de María González Navarro se presenta a sí mismo como una “nueva hermenéutica” (23). La novedad involucra dos aspectos: uno que llamaremos metateórico y otro hermenéutico en propiedad. Hablando metateóricamente, el libro presenta una hermenéutica gadameriana vigorizada y robustecida por las teorías pragma-dialécticas de la argumentación. Desde el punto de vista hermenéutico propiamente dicho, la novedad reposa en que se considera que la interpretación correcta está indesligablemente vinculada a la argumentación abductiva.

Se busca rastrear la imagen que Platón tiene de Heráclito y articularla con la estructura argumentativa del Cratilo, para comprender las necesidades textuales a las que responde la doctrina del flujo perpetuo, es decir, la discusión sobre la corrección (ὀρθότης) del nombre. Gracias a la inclusión del testimonio heraclíteo, resulta posible rastrear la presunta consolidación de la tesis sobre los nombres primarios y los secundarios como el eje de la separación entre dos planos de realidad (uno estable y uno móvil) (...) y de la teoría de las Ideas -es decir, como la base de la epistemología platónica presente en los diálogos de madurez-. The article seeks to trace the image Plato has of Heraclitus and connect it with the argumentative structure of the Cratylus in order to understand the textual needs that give rise to the doctrine of perpetual flux, that is, the discussion regarding the correctness (ὀρθότης) of names. The inclusion of Heraclitus's testimony makes it possible to trace the alleged consolidation of the thesis regarding primary and secondary names as the axis of separation between two levels of reality (one stable, the other, changing) and the theory of Ideas -that is, as the basis of Plato's epistemology as set forth in the late dialogues-. (shrink)

La palabra “Grimorio” deviene del provenzal “Grammaire noir” traducible como “Gramática negra” o “Gramática de la oscuridad”. Estos son los libros de magia utilizados por brujas y hechiceros desde que el Diablo formó parte de la imaginería popular. Parecería contradictorio que un texto sagrado —siguiendo las ideas de Roger Caillois y James Frazer—, correspondería con la “escrituralidad”: la estructura de su mensaje debería ser puntual y científica; pero hay ejemplos donde no se respeta esto. Dentro de la literatura fantástica hispanoamericana (...) encontramos manuscritos y libros sagrados con una gran carga de oralidad: el argentino Enrique Anderson Imbert con su cuento “El Grimorio” donde, más que una gramática, parece una historia dedicada a alguien. Para este estudio se utilizará la novela corta de Emiliano González: El discípulo; una novela de horror sobrenatural ; donde aparece una versión extraña de un grimorio. La estrategia de análisis parte de los estudios sobre la evolución y uso cotidiano de la lengua de Ignace Gelb, Peter Koch y Wulf Oesterreicher, para determinar si es una cuestión cultural o si es tan solo una curiosidad literaria el deconstruir así un texto sagrado al hacer que tenga elementos orales. ¿Se está reconfigurando o resemantizando el manuscrito como texto sagrado en la literatura mexicana del siglo xx? ¿Se puede llamar a estos escritos “grimorios” aunque no se traten de empastados con las mismas características del grimoire medieval? Estas respuestas esperan dilucidarse a partir de la literatura y de su estudio. (shrink)

Patina is the word used for the green or brown film formed on the surface of old bronze, an excess of which can mask the true characteristics of the original masterpiece. Filippo Baldinucci used the word patina in a modern sense for first time in his book “Tuscan Vocabulary of the Art of Design”. Metaphors have been part of philosophical speech since the time of Plato. This figure of speech is used to attempt to provide a sensitive presence of an (...) idea to improve understanding and to make a more vivid perception of that concept. On analysing the creative process of contemporary re-search on health topics and its further dissemination, we defend the epistemological thesis that there is always some degree of patina on an original article and this may obscure the underlying scientific work. Conclusion: We consider that patina in scientific papers is very different from the concept of epidemiological bias. We think that any researcher who reads an original article acts as a restorer of knowledge. If a reader is aware of the existence of scientific patina, that reader will know how to look through it and see the masterpiece hidden underneath. (shrink)

Here we study two connexive logics based on one of the conditionals introduced by Church in [4] and on some negations defined through falsity constants in the sense of Ackermann in [1].

El Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior (EEES) establece que el aprendizaje debe estar centrado en el estudiante. Partiendo de este enunciado, el artículo explica cómo la gamificación puede ser una técnica pedagógica que propicie el ansiado cambio en la docencia universitaria hacia donde marca el EEES. Este trabajo presenta el diseño de una metodología de gamificación sencilla y fácil de implementar en un Grado de Ingeniería utilizando Kahoot! como herramienta y su evolución a lo largo de tres cursos académicos. Los (...) resultados indican que los alumnos ven más atractiva la asignatura, aumenta el seguimiento y mejoran sus resultados académicos. (shrink)

The book proposes an alternative model of technological development, that of engaging technologies. This model studies the way in which technological development can be perfect towards technological solutions compatible with sustainable development, with the ideals of solidarity or with cooperative and or only competitive participation. In short, the book is an analytical, descriptive and normative journey around the concept of "endearing technologies" coined by Miguel Ángel Quintanilla, which highlights the democratic values for the control of technology as opposed to (...) the purely intrinsic values of technical efficiency and performance, as opposed to the automatic and uncontrolled tendency of technology. (shrink)

La creación burlada trata de la más terrible de las sospechas: que toda nuestra vida se halle edificada sobre un inmenso fraude. Esta cuarta parte de la importante Seudología general que Miguel Catalán viene preparando durante los últimos años estudia la ilusión del cosmos y el fraude de la vida, dos nociones que han expresado desde antiguo el miedo de los hombres a verse engañados por fuerzas sobrenaturales. La experiencia, tan penosa como universal, del niño que descubre por vez (...) primera la mentira de los adultos, así como el temor a la falsedad del mundo y el fraude de la vida aparecen en los grandes textos originarios, desde los Vedas y Homero hasta el Barroco y los relatos actuales, Matrix o El show de Truman. El libro recoge, pues, las distintas formas culturales en que se ha manifestado la conciencia de que los dioses y otros poderes numinosos, incluyendo la naturaleza deificada, han engañado a los hombres en virtud del inmenso poder y conocimiento de que disponen en comparación con la debilidad y la ignorancia propiamente humanas. A partir de esa conciencia de inferioridad de los hombres se despliegan los tópicos de la vida como engaño de la naturaleza, como juego de los dioses ociosos, como teatro del mundo, como sueño en la mente de Dios, o carrera en el laberinto o ejercicio de poder demiúrgico. Miguel Catalán González (Valencia, 1958), Doctor en Filosofía con una tesis sobre el pragmatismo clásico y profesor de Ética y Deontología en la Universidad UCH-CEU de Valencia, es autor de una veintena de libros, entre los que destacan sus obras filosóficas Pensamiento y acción o Proceso a la guerra, la colección de aforismos El sol de medianoche (Edicions de Ponent, 2001) y el prólogo a su propio Diccionario de falsas creencias (Ronsel, 2002), que manifiesta por vez primera el interés del autor por las relaciones entre error y falsedad. Con El prestigio de la lejanía. Ilusión, autoengaño y utopía (Ronsel, 2004), Premio de Ensayo Juan Gil-Albert en 1998 y a su vez de la Crítica Valenciana en 2005, Catalán dio inicio a su investigación sobre el engaño. A este siguió Antropología de la mentira (Muchnik, 2005), que fue premio de ensayo Alfons el Magnànim, y en tercer lugar, Anatomía del secreto (Muchnik, 2008). Ha sido editor y traductor, entre otros, de Karl Krause, Marcel Proust y Ambrose Bierce. En 2005 obtuvo el Premio Nacional de Investigación “Ángel Herrera” por su labor en el ámbito de las ciencias sociales. (shrink)

Se ha dicho repetidamente de España que es un país conflictivo, inestable, violento, invertebrado, incomprensible. «Pensé (dijo Marías en uno de los 250 artículos que me dictó a partir del año 2000) que esto se debía a un error de perspectiva: a no ver cómo ha sido y es; a proyectar sobre él imágenes inadecuadas, trasladadas de otros países de distinto origen, formación, proyecto, argumento. España parecía “rara” y escasamente comprensible porque no se reparaba en su realidad. Un pez extraño (...) porque no era un pez, sino un pájaro. Visto así, sorprendentemente inteligible». Por otro lado, se habla últimamente «de “nacionalismo español”, algo inexistente. El nacionalismo es exclusivista, negativo, hostil, reductor; la visión que los españoles han tenido de su país ha sido usualmente lo contrario». Se acepta fácilmente que «España es un país de rupturas, propenso a la discordia». La historia, en cambio, según me dictó Marías en otro artículo, «muestra un grado sorprendente de continuidad. Los cambios de orientación no son excesivos ni bruscos, las variaciones históricas han sido moderadas, comprensibles, las requeridas por la condición viviente de un país». A lo largo «de muchos siglos, lo que sorprende es la coherencia de la historia española, su continuidad». Prueba de ello «es el carácter inteligible de casi toda nuestra historia». Este libro (de 203 págs.) aborda filosóficamente (desde la "razón histórica") la inteligibilidad de España y del Mundo Hispánico. Reseña por Miguel Ángel Velasco en "Alfa y Omega" 785 (2012) 25. Índice: Introducción. ESPAÑA INTELIGIBLE- RAZÓN HISTÓRICA DE LAS ESPAÑAS- La razón histórica y España- La Hispania romana y la España visigoda- La pérdida de España y la Reconquista de la España perdida- La primera nación- De la Nación de Europa a la Supernación transeuropea- Las Españas- El proyecto cristiano de España- La "Universitas Christiana"- La leyenda negra y sus consecuencias- Los errores de España y la decadencia- Prosperidad de la Monarquía Española en el siglo XVIII- La revolución y la invasión francesas- La desmembración de la Monarquía Española- La desfiguración de Hispanoamérica- Hispanoamérica, Iberoamérica, Latinoamérica- El injerto español en América- Remedios del aislamiento y la incomprensión- El milenario proyecto histórico de España-. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that (...) consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call ‘perspectival de se representation’, and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)

This book brings together previously unpublished work which looks at issues concerning the foundations and applications of a prominent branch of virtue epistemology: “performance-based epistemology”. The chapters in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework of PBE: the relations between apt success and luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of competences; the kind of reliability needed for knowledge and justification; the nature of epistemic agency; and some ways of enriching the (...) basic conceptual framework of PBE. The chapters in Part II discuss the application of PBE to outstanding problems in contemporary epistemology, such as the nature of a priori intuition; internalist objections to epistemic externalism; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in the acquisition of knowledge; the value of second-order reflection; the nature of some epistemic incompetences; and the problem of epistemic circularity. (shrink)

Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles (...) to give up on the other. (shrink)

For a standard Finsler F on a manifold M, the domain is the whole tangent bundle T M and the fundamental tensor g is positive-definite. However, in many cases, these two conditions hold in a relaxed form only, namely one has either a psuedo-Finsler metric or a conic Finsler metric. Our aim is twofold. First, we want to give an account of quite a few subtleties that appear under such generalizations, say, for conic pseudo-finsler metrics. Second, we aim to provide (...) some criteria that determine when a pseudo-Finsler metric F obtained as a general homogeneous combination of Finsler metrics and one-forms is again a Finsler-metric -- or, more precisely, that the conic domain on which g remains positive-definite. Such a combination generalizes the known -metrics in different directions. Remarkably, classical examples of Finsler metrics are reobtained and extended, with explicit computations of their fundamental tensors. (shrink)

Este trabajo examina parte del pensamiento de Kant de cara a precisar en qué sentido puede pensarse la universalidad como una exigencia para la filosofía moral y cómo las investigaciones de ese autor pueden contribuir a esclarecer esta cuestión. El análisis de los argumentos muestra algunas inconsistencias lógicas en el desarrollo del problema de la universalización moral que los especialistas han tratado de explicar, a partir de las cuales sugerimos que una alternativa de análisis gramatical al estilo de Wittgenstein puede (...) ayudar a clarificar. El trabajo es, pues, crítico y pro positivo y conlleva una interpretación programática de tesis kantianas. (shrink)

Castillos de Teruel. Historia y Patrimonio. Actas de las I Jornadas Castillos de Teruel:de la puesta en valor a la didáctica. Mora de Rubielos, 2018 Teruel: Asociación para la Recuperación de los Castillos Turolenses, Qualcina. Arqueología, Cultura yPatrimonio, y Acrótera Gestión del Patrimonio 201895 págs. 21 x 15 cm.ISBN: 978-84-948836-1-3.

Este trabajo indaga la dimensión poética del testimonio en situaciones donde el agravio se encuentra tejido entre discursos impulsados por aspiraciones democráticas y dinámicas destructivas de la diversidad lingüística y cultural. A partir de la documentación del caso de Inés Fernández Ortega y etnografías en La Casa de los Saberes, Gúwa Kúma, se abordarán las prácticas de cuidado, los discursos de verdad y resistencia ante los mecanismos de reproducción social, política y cultural generados por la transición partidista en México y (...) el militarismo diseminado como reflujo de la violencia. En este marco la plasticidad, el testimonio no se encuentra solo y únicamente en marcos lingüísticos y ostensibles, que se despliegan con pretensiones de persuasión y de una verdad aceptada de manera lógica racional, sino se instala de manera dinámica, clandestina y eventual desde expresiones corporales múltiples, contra normativas que dinamizan vínculos inesperados y afectividades alternativas que atestan formas de habitar la tierra desde la vulnerabilidad sin daño, la comunalidad sin explotación y el cuidado sin condiciones. (shrink)

In Postsocial History: An Introduction, historian Miguel A. Cabrera points to the crisis of modernity as a locus for the collapse of social historical models. Previously established theories of social change and social relations are proving insufficient, calling for the emergence of a new social historical theory. By arguing convincingly for the inclusion of language in that model, Cabrera awakens a revolutionary new approach to historiography. The book will prove indispensable to historians, and to social scientists in general, who (...) are dissatisfied with the old paradigms and seek new ways of addressing the challenges of social research. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

El manuscrito Resc/55 del CSIC contiene un apartado en el que se relata el sueño que un ṣāliḥ de Túnez tuvo con el profeta Mahoma. En el sueño, el Profeta le cuenta al soñador los sucesos del día del juicio, le hace una serie de recomendaciones y le promete que, por pequeña que sea la fe que tenga un musulmán, entrará en el Paraíso siempre que siga siendo musulmán. Estas palabras de seguro resonarían de manera especial entre los mudéjares o (...) moriscos que seleccionaron el texto y que lo copiaron muchas veces. Desde un acercamiento que toma en cuenta tanto la tradición árabe literaria de relatos edificantes de sueños (manamāt), como el entorno socio-histórico de los moriscos, el autor de este artículo analiza el contenido de la historia. De particular importancia es entender cómo el texto legitima su contenido y presenta las palabras del profeta como auténticas echando mano de una larga tradición de sueños protagonizados por Mahoma. Se incluye al final del artículo una transliteración del texto aljamiado. (shrink)